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The contemporary art world – namely, the current artistic and cultural 
situation, which emerged at the beginning of the Twentieth century – has led 
to a process of profound rethinking of the relationship between art and law. 
This relationship is inherent in the very concept of art and is as old as the 
history of the arts. In particular, the relationship between art and law, as it has 
structured itself from the beginning of the Twentieth century, has two vital 
functions – one of which is intrinsic to the concept of art, the other being 
extrinsic – the understanding of which is essential to investigate the contem-
porary art world.
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ВОПЛОЩЁННЫЕ ЗНАЧЕНИЯ И НОРМАТИВНОСТЬ.
НЕСКОЛЬКО ЗАМЕЧАНИЙ
К НОВОЙ КОНЦЕПЦИИ ИСКУССТВА
Т. Андина
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Нынешняя художественная и культурная ситуация, характерная для 
современного мира искусства с начала ХХ века, привела этот мир к про-
цессу глубокого переосмысления отношений между искусством и пра-
вом. Это соотношение заложено в самой концепции искусства и так же 
старо, как и история искусств. В частности, отношения между искусством 
и правом, как они сложились с начала ХХ века, имеют две жизненно важ-
ные функции, одна из которых внутренне присуща концепции искусства, 
другая имеет внешнее происхождение. Понимание этих функций играет 
существенную роль в исследовании современного мира искусства.
Ключевые слова: искусство, онтология, воплощённые значения, нор-
мативность.
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The aim of this paper is to close the gap between contemporary and, 
so to speak, traditional arts. My view is that this gap was produced due 
to the lack of comprehension that both the experts and common sense 
have of so-called contemporary arts. Within the field of descriptive 
metaphysics, my goal is that of drawing a broad definition of the 
notion of art, one that also includes all types of artworks that have 
called for a revision of our taxonomies, mainly through a reconsidera-
tion of the relation between art and reality. In order to achieve this 
goal, I will briefly present the theoretical problems addressed by phi-
losophy when reflecting on contemporary art, and I will explain the 
reason why these problems need cooperation between philosophy and 
law in order to be tackled.
I will then present some ideas for a new definition of art, through 
a particular application of the concept of normativity.
1. Exploring the Gap
I would like begin by referring what are the problems to be faced
by the scholars who are dealing, in jurisprudence, with works of art, 
especially the contemporary ones [Ajani, Donati 2011]. These problems 
are not raised just from the perspective of scholarship: in fact, our 
common sense has also been asked to change its “standard” view on 
art. Let me explain what I mean by telling you a short piece of popular 
cartoon series: “The Simpsons”1. In this episode, Homer Simpson, the 
protagonist of the series, is trying to make a DYI barbecue. After many 
misadventures that frustrate his ambition of making a nice barbecue, 
Homer tries return the whole thing to the store. As he’s driving, a car 
accident causes the load to fall into the road and Homer decides to run 
away without worrying about it. The next day, a young woman, who is 
an art dealer, visits Homer at home asking him for the permission to 
organize an exhibition with his “work” – without a doubt, it is a work 
of art.
We will not follow Homer in his personal experience in understand-
ing what it means to be an artist and creating works of art: here we
just want to underline the existence of a common sense view about 
contemporary art. Such view is well expressed by Marge, Homer’s wife, 
almost at the end of the story. To be an artist was Marge’s dream: to 
realize this dream she attended very good schools and practiced a lot, 
and now Homer, without having done anything, is defined a great artist. 
This makes no sense.
1 The Simpsons. Season 10. Episode 19.
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Homer’s answer is also inspired by common sense: in his view, to 
be an artist means to be able to realize well-made art works, which 
represent reality in a clear way. In a word, in Marge’s works of art 
things look like they are in reality. They are a reproduction of reality – 
a form of mimesis. An important legitimation to this intuition came 
from Plato’s The Republic (book X): drawing his metaphysics of the 
universe, Plato classified works of art as copies of things, which are 
themselves copies of ideas. Comparing to the perfection of the ideal 
reality of ideas, the reality of the material world is less perfect. At the 
lowest level of perfection, therefore, we find works of art: at the end of 
the day, they are copies of real things that are, in turn, copies of ideas.
It is not my aim to discuss this position in order to distinguish – for 
example – the role played by philosophy from that played by common 
sense within this dispute on the real nature on art. My aim is different 
indeed and rather focuses on those cases in which the Platonic frame-
work seems not to work – in particular over the Twentieth century.
A point that was certainly discovered by Plato and that is indepen-
dent of any particular cultural mind-set is that, in order to state some-
thing about art, it is necessary to state something about the relation 
between art and reality. In Plato’s view this relation consists in copying, 
not just mirroring, parts of reality creating some objects, which become 
in turn part of reality. The arts of the Nineteenth showed us basically 
two things: the first one is that the Platonic way is not the right one
to understand art, and the second one is that, despite the mistake, the 
Platonic intuition is correct – to understand the very nature of art it is 
necessary to look deeply into the relationship between art and reality. 
Indeed, it is this relationship that has been investigated by contempo-
rary arts and especially by the Avant-Garde.
How was this investigation carried out in the Nineteenth century? 
My sense is that artists either introduced new confusion inside our 
taxonomies or unveiled some mistakes that were already present in 
them.
I’m going to recall some examples briefly, as all the cases raised by 
customs officials make this lack in our taxonomies particularly evident. 
We can cite at least three different situations, in three different moments 
in time and three different places in the world2.
Imagine the scene. It was 1926, at the customs of the United States. 
Bird in Space (fig. 1), a sculpture by Costantin Brâncuş i, arrived to New 
York by sea. Upon inspecting it, customs officials challenged the idea 
that the strange object was a sculpture, seeing as it in no way resembled 
2 Cfr. Andina 2013 for a more expanded discussion.
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a bird. For this reason, they refused to categorize Brâncuş i’s creation as 
a work of art, preferring to consider it a kitchen utensil.
They therefore applied to it the taxation that was normally reserved 
for merchandise, while works of art were subject to fiscal exemption. 
As expected, Brâncuş i was outraged and the matter was brought to 
Federal court. Thus began one of the most notorious trials in the history 
of art: ‘Brâncuş i vs. the United States’. Edward Steichen, the photogra-
pher who had bought the sculpture, explained the affair to Gertrude 
Vanderbilt Whitney, founder of the Whitney Museum in New York 
who, upon realizing that the case would become a formidable judicial 
precedent, offered to cover the legal fees of the trial. Six members of 
the jury redounded in Brâncuş i’s favour: Edward Steichen, sculptor 
Jacop Epstein, the editor of the journal The Arts, the editor of Vanity 
Fair, the director of the Brooklyn Museum of Art and art critic Henry 
McBride. Marcus Higginbotham represented customs. The US govern-
ment had two jurors as well: sculptors Robert Aitken and Thomas Jones. 
The state defended the customs officials, recalling a prior case: ‘United 
States vs. Olivotti’ from 1916, in which the only artefacts that qualified 
as works of art were those that were recognized as imitations of objects 
in nature.
The following are a few lines from the debate: Jude Waite asks 
Steichen ‘What do you call this?’ Steichen responds: ‘I call it what the 
sculptor calls it, oiseau, which means bird’. Waite continues: ‘How can 
you say that it is a bird if it does not resemble one?’ Steichen: ‘I am not 
saying that it is a bird, I am saying that it looks like a bird to me just as 
it was stylized and named by the artist’. Waite replies: ‘And the only 
reason for which you say it is a bird is because he (the artist) called it 
one?’ Steichen: ‘Yes, your Honor’. Waite persists: ‘If you had seen it on 
the road, would you have called it a bird? If you had seen it in the forest, 
would you have shot at it?’ Steichen: ‘No, your Honor’ [Biro 1995].
The trial came to a close on 26 November 1928 with the acknowledge-
ment that Brâncuş i’s work, Bird in Space, was in fact a work of art.
In this case we have an artefact, a sculpture, which does not resemble 
an object that customs officials are able to identify clearly. The object, 
which has no clear identity, brings some confusion into the taxonomies 
of the officials who consider the artwork as a mere material object – 
knives have a similar shape usually.
Now let’s move to a different place. The problem is similar: Brillo 
Boxes (fig. 2), Andy Warhol’s famous sculpture exhibited in 1964 at the 
Stable Gallery in New York, disembarked in Canada in 1965 in the care 
of art merchant Jerrold Morris. Customs officials yet again classified 
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them as products, specifically boxes from a grocery store, and applied 
to them the corresponding taxation. Their confusion, in reality, was 
understandable: grocery stores were full of Brillo boxes, containing 
sponges for cleaning pots and pans. An expert was therefore consulted, 
Mr Charles Comfort, director of the National Gallery of Canada who, 
having seeing Warhol’s work in photographs, supported the opinion 
of the customs officials: Brillo Boxes was not a work of art.
The scene is only apparently the same: this time, indeed, the resem-
blance, the mimetic relationship between the artwork and the material 
object, is not in question. The Brillo Boxes are too similar to Brillo Boxes 
in grocery stores to be works of art. In the Brillo Boxes case the customs 
officials followed a line of reasoning that is contrary to that used in
the case of Brancusi’s sculpture. Barncusi’s sculpture, in fact, did not 
resemble the part of reality it was named after. Here, the question is 
quite the opposite: are the Brillo Boxes made by Andy Warhol too 
similar to the ordinary objects drawn by James Harvey, an artist and 
a quite well-known designer, to be works of art?
As we know – common sense is generally very sensitive to this idea – 
our naive taxonomies make a distinction between the class of works of 
art and the class of material objects. How is it possible – this is the im-
plicit question posed by the inspectors – that something resembling so 
closely a very common object could be a work of art? At the end of the 
day, we know that – as Walter Benjamin said – works of art must show 
at least some proprieties that they don’t share with ordinary objects. An 
artwork must be original, not reproducible, and unique. The Brillo Boxes 
by Warhol were produced in series, in a huge number of exemplars, in-
spired by – not to say, copied from – ordinary boxes. So, what has to be 
said about our ontological distinction between the class of artworks and 
the class of ordinary objects if – as it seems – there are some artworks 
which are identified by the same proprieties as ordinary objects?
Let me make another example, showing another problem with our 
taxonomies: this time it is the work Icons (fig. 3) that is passing through 
European customs. These are works made with fluorescent lights sym-
bolizing the icons of our time, and Dan Flavin, the American artist, 
exhibited them in some of the most prestigious museums in the world. 
Nevertheless, as was described by The Guardian, customs officials in 
the European Community determined that Flavin’s works were light 
fixtures and, accordingly, they had to be subjected to the corresponding 
toll (meaning no offence to the art world).
The art gallery, on the contrary, declared them to be works of art, 
asking that they be subjected to a value-added tax (VAT) of 5 %, as 
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stated in Chapter 97 of the British Common Customs Tariff. After 
having interpreted the tariff table and having identified no correspon-
dence between the imported objects and the categories featured on 
the list, British customs authorities refused to allow either object to be 
classified as a work of art. Both objects were subjected to what was 
then the standard rate of 17,5 % and to a customs fee of 3,7 %. Follow-
ing the gallery’s opposition, the London court stated that the objects 
are works of art, and confirmed the applicability of the requested tax 
breaks. The conclusion of this incident is noteworthy: a few EU mem-
ber countries, whose customs offices had dealt with similar cases, 
brought the case to the European Commission that, on August 11 
2010, issued a Regulation (no. 731/2010) in which it is stated that
the sculptures by Dan Flavin cannot be classified as art, but rather as 
“wall light fittings”.
As you may note, this case is very similar to the Brillo Boxes case: 
the customs officers considered the fluorescent lights to be ordinary 
objects. This is why their (and our) taxonomies do not allow for the 
possibility that an ordinary object could be also a work of art, without 
it having any visible property.
2. Arguing towards a new definition
I hope that now the framework is quite clear: during the Twentieth 
century most of the artistic production was thought to mess up the 
accepted division between ordinary objects and works of art. What was 
the aim of this? In philosophical jargon, we call an operation of this 
kind a meta-reflection on the meaning and extension of the concept
(i.e. art), targeted to reconfiguring an idea or even a definition of the 
concept. The artists evidently wanted to question the traditional view: 
for them, the relationship between art and reality is not a relation 
between a model (reality) and a copy (the work of art).
Certainly works of art are part of reality, but not in the same way 
as – say – the mirror image of Monna Lisa is. The relation between art 
and reality is the core of the definition of art that was questioned 
throughout the Twentieth century. Within this context, it would have 
been very odd if philosophy had not attempted to respond to a prob-
lem posed by both the art world and the whole of society.
Now, before starting with my argument for a new definition of art, 
I would like to address a couple of methodological points. The first one 
concerns some expressions I will use in my argument. I will adopt 
a basic ontology composed by three classes of things: natural objects, 
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artefacts and ideal objects. By artefacts I mean all those objects that are 
entirely created or partially modified by an intentional activity.
I will adopt a wide conception of normativity: I will claim that nor-
mativity corresponds to the awareness that something can be correct or 
incorrect, but also that certain judgments can be better than others.
Finally, a few words about my general perspective in philosophy of 
art: in my idea, it is not a concern of philosophy to establish “what is 
art and what is not”, what object is an artwork and what is not. In 
other words, it is not a task of philosophy to prescribe a normative 
position, that is, a set of rules in order to distinguish what is art from 
what isn’t. Instead, philosophy may do a good job in showing good 
arguments to explain the current state of affairs in the art world. In 
other words, I prefer a descriptive metaphysics to the prescriptive one. 
My view therefore is in the field of the descriptive metaphysics and 
my goal is that of drawing a broad definition of the notion of art, 
including all types of artworks that have asked for a revision of our 
taxonomies mainly trough a reconsideration of the relation between 
art and reality.
So, now I would like to present the definition of art on which I have 
been working, along with some reasons to explain why normativity 
plays a central role in drawing a much more functional definition. My 
definition is the following:
A work of art is a [1] social and historical object, [2] an artefact, which 
embodies a representation, in the form of an inscribed trace [3] upon a medium 
that is not transparent.
All three conditions are jointly necessary, and my idea is that condi-
tions [2] and [3] meet both in the sphere of normativity.
Let us start with the first condition: A work of art is a social and 
historical object.
The first condition puts forward two ideas: for an artwork to exist, 
a social system and the art-world are jointly necessary. What does this 
mean? Basically, that artworks are artefacts, namely products of human 
intentionality, which are made in a certain time by people who aim say 
something to someone else. The relevant point at this stage is this: 
a further element seems to be necessary in addition to the existence of 
a social system; this element is the art-world which, in my perspective, 
is necessary to include contemporary art in the definition of art.
But what is the art world, and why do I suppose it is necessary to 
include it to draw a new, broader definition of art? That of art world is 
a vague concept that, because of its very vagueness, can help us better 
understand the idea that a social context is necessary for an artwork
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to exist. I will adopt the definition sketched by the American philoso-
pher George Dickie to describe the art world:
“The core personnel of the art world is a loosely organized, but nev-
ertheless related, set of persons including artists (understood to refer to 
painters, writers, composers), producers, museum directors, museum-
goers, theater-goers, reporters for newspapers, critics for publications 
of all sorts, art historians, art theorists, philosophers of art, and others. 
These are the people who keep the machinery  of the art world working 
and thereby provide for its continuing existence” [Dickie 1974, 438–439].
American philosopher and art critic Arthur Danto used the concept 
of art world for the first time in a 1964 paper. His aim was to underline 
that an artwork is made up not only by formal proprieties, but also by 
other properties, some depending on the cultural and historical context, 
others depending on the narrative of the history of art; both groups of 
properties meet the intellect, not the senses.
Danto never formulated an institutional theory of art, that is, he 
never intended to say that what is art merely depends on the cultural 
context. He intended to say that there are several factors (which 
nowadays are certainly of increasing relevance) that constitute the 
inner nature of an art work, and that the comprehension of these 
factors is as important as the comprehension of the so-called formal 
or aesthetics qualities.
Elsewhere [Andina 2013, 48 ss.] I have defined the art world as 
a quasi-institutional entity: the art world resembles an informal insti-
tution (that is to say, a social practice or an organization) that functions 
thanks to ingenuous and unwritten rules. The actions performed by 
such a quasi-institution are of a different type compared to those per-
formed by institutional entities. Actions performed by institutional 
entities take place in an endless amount of cases: marriage, university 
degrees, certification exams, professional practice, the stipulation of 
a contract and so forth. In each of these examples, a particular institu-
tion (the church, the State, a professional association, etc.) has the 
power to transform an action, or even an object, into something else, 
by attributing to it a particular function – think of when a wall be-
comes a political border, or when the “I do” of a bride and groom 
turns into a legally valid promise. The fact that we have an ingenuous 
and, for the most part, vague concept of art world at our disposal still 
legitimizes our supposing that it is, essentially, something or, in other 
words, a certain type of entity. It is, in fact, an entity that ‘emerges’ 
from (and, therefore, is bound to be dependent on) the elements that 
form it.
Fig. 1. Constantin Brancusi, 1876–1957. Bird 
in Space. Sculpture. 1941. The Museum
of Modern Art. ID Number: 81503. Source: 
Image and original data provided by the The 
Museum of Modern Art, http://www.moma.org
Fig. 2. Andy Warhol, 1928–1987. Brillo Box (Soap Pads). 
Sculpture. 1964. The Museum of Modern Art. ID Number: 
81383. Source: Image and original data provided by the 
The Museum of Modern Art, http://www.moma.org
Fig. 3. Dan Flavin, American, 1933–1996. Untitled. 
Sculpture. 1968. The Museum of Modern Art. ID Number: 
80966. Source: Image and original data provided by the 
The Museum of Modern Art, http://www.moma.org
Fig. 4. Kazimir Malevich, 1878–1935. 
Painterly Realism. Boy with Knapsack – 
Color Masses in the Fourth Dimension. 
Painting. 1915. The Museum of Modern Art. 
ID Number: 80383. Source: Image and 
original data provided by the The Museum 
of Modern Art, http://www.moma.org
Slide 1. Street sign “dead end”
Slide 2. Works by Clet Abraham
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The art world exists because museums, artists, artworks, consumers 
and an art market exist. The institution of the ‘art world’ is founded 
upon the union and the integration of all of these elements. In certain 
cases, this relation seems to be bidirectional: artists like Duchamp exist 
precisely because an art world exists, and works of art such as Bot-
tle Rack exist because museums and collections such as the Robert 
Rauschenberg Foundation exist. Moreover, museums and foundations 
have been allowed to do what they do by the art world itself, even 
though the contrary also holds true – the Rauschenberg Foundation 
exists because works like Duchamp’s exist, and must be conserved and 
passed on.
In general, art theories refer to two different types of institutions: 
following Jeffrey Wieand’s classification, ‘A-institutions’ and ‘P-insti-
tutions’ (‘A’ stands for action and ‘P’ for person) [Wieand 1981, 409–
417] . An A-institution is one that produces actions whose tokens are 
‘instantiations’ of a particular kind of action. These kinds of institutions 
distinguish themselves from others because they produce actions that 
are governed by rules: two people who wish to be joined in marriage 
can only do so within an institution where certain rules have been pre-
emptively accepted and sanctioned. In other words, an A-institution 
produces a sort of conventional act. P-institutions, conversely, are under-
stood as ‘quasi-persons’, or as agents: they perform actions and can be 
called upon to account for them. In general, P-institutions act through 
members who operate by themselves (examples might include state of-
ficials, the bishops of a church or the managing director of a company). 
A State may celebrate, say, marriages through its officials and therefore 
can perform institutional acts. Some of these acts can only be per-
formed by a certain type of institution: in Italy, for instance, marriages 
can also be celebrated by a P-institution, such as the church, while
institutional acts, such as a declaration of war, can only be performed 
by the government.
In short, the distinction between A-institutions and P-institutions 
marks a distinction between institutions as acts (or as types of acts) and 
institutions as agents. Whereas in Dickie’s theory the art world is made 
by both type of institutions which play a role in transfiguring a material 
object into a work of art, I think that art world in many cases provides 
some instruments to the artists in order to complete its creation and to 
the public in order to perform a better comprehension of the art works. 
In both cases, the art world is indeed an instrument to better perform 
the creation or the interpretation, but it is not the real maker of the 
work of arts. It is not through a performative act made by the art world 
20
ΠΡΑΞΗΜΑ. 2015. 4 (6)
that art works are such, but the art world is nonetheless necessary to 
provide the background for the creation and the comprehension of the 
art works.
Thus far for the first condition. Now let us come to the other two 
conditions:
A work of art is a social and historical object, [2] an artefact, which 
embodies a representation, in the form of an inscribed trace [3] upon 
a medium that is not transparent.
The second condition refers to two elements. The first one is the 
“artefactuality”: works of arts are artefacts, that is, material objects 
created or altered trough an intentional action performed by human 
beings. The relationship between artefact and reality is not, as in Pla-
tonic metaphysics, a mimetic one; however it is centred upon repre-
sentation – something that lies at the core of human life. While it is 
true that perception and representation are both at the core of our
experience of the world, it is also true that the artistic representation
is structured in a peculiar way, compared to the non-artistic one.
The most important characteristics of the artistic representation are 
two: to work properly an artistic representation doesn’t need to neces-
sarily be realistic, nor does it have to grasp reality as it is. However, the 
artistic representation (depiction, as it is called in philosophical lan-
guage) has to embody the artist’s rough view. Works of art (along with 
our beliefs) carry representations that are intentional. This means that 
while in epistemic activities we are dealing with the truth, in depiction 
artists have no obligation to deal with the truth. We do not need to carry 
out any sort of inquiry ‘into the world’ in order to understand Don 
Quixote; to stick to the text and follow the plot is sufficient, as well as 
convenient. Certainly, if we were to possess subsidiary knowledge of 
the life of knights errant, our understanding of the novel would im-
prove, but we would not have so much as an additional ounce of knowl-
edge. Works do not say anything about the world if not incidentally 
and, as is often said, accidentally. In other words, a tourist is not likely 
to choose to walk the streets of Manhattan by relying on Aner Shalev’s 
novel Where New York Ends instead of a Lonely Planet travel guide. The 
novel could, perhaps, be extremely accurate in its representations of the 
city, but whether it truly is so is a question that concerns the author’s 
choice.
It is for this reason that we can understand an image – let’s say, a rep-
resentation of the Sphinx – without having to ask ourselves if a lion 
with a human head really exists in an Egyptian desert. In general, then, 
we understand an image (that is to say, we classify it adequately, or we 
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identify its representational content) without knowing if what it depicts 
actually exists; we understand its meaning and this is enough.
The third condition is about the way in which a depiction can be 
embodied in a medium: this marks the singularity of each work of art 
and determines its artistic quality. My sense is that this third condition 
needs to be further investigated if we want to better explain the defi-
nition. Differently from all forms of scientific knowledge which are
used to embody representation in structured and articulated concepts, 
works of art embody rough ideas, not only using words but also sever-
al others media. And in those cases in which words are used, we have 
to remember that they embody intentional representations. In any case, 
the intentional representation embodied is structured in such a way 
that the work of art usually says something on a double level: the artist 
says something about something (the first level) trough representation, 
and the medium, which is composed by representation plus the physi-
cal qualities of the object, says something about the world (that is, 
a specific culture, a particular historical era etc.). Let me try to explain 
by referring to some examples.
A cross is an age-old semantic object with a history that predates its 
use throughout Christianity. If we consider its modern-day meanings, 
those which we are able to decipher without the help of reading guides, 
the following come to mind: the death of Jesus, the presence of a church, 
a hospital, a cemetery or a tomb, a pharmacy, a street intersection or 
a dead-end street. The matter is quite simple, and can be formulated
in these terms: for what reason is the first cross, depicted in slide, not 
a work of art, while the second and the third, depicted in slides, are one?
The cross in the first slide represents a dead end on a street sign 
(slide 1), while second slide depict two works by imaginative and 
polyvalent French artist Clet Abraham (slide 2). In his cross, the artist 
evidently embodies new meanings. In Abraham’s work, the road sign 
in the shape of a cross becomes a real cross. Hence the first image, 
which displays a stylized body hanging from a pole, with no way out, 
just as the dead-end street depicted on the street sign, and second 
image, which cites the most classic and widely known deposition from 
the cross. What is the difference between these and normal signs that 
also have representative content? Abraham’s representations are con-
tained in a medium, that is, a canvas, which says something about the 
idea of sacredness in the postmodern era: hanging on walls and found 
along the streets of Florence, the signs are looked at because of what 
they are and not only because of the classic meaning that they embody 
(the warning of a dead-end street).
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Abraham’s signage (along with many other works in contemporary 
art) is particularly rich as it presents a stratified plurality of meanings. 
There are the meanings exemplified by the street sign and those imple-
mented by the artist: both meanings are greatly akin. The cross is a dead-
end road: a man who has been crucified or who is taken down from 
a cross, and lies in the arms of a grieving mother, represents the expres-
sion of that which is, in the most definitive of ways, inescapable – death. 
There is no trace of transcendence in the representation of a man hang-
ing from a cross depicted on a street sign, nor is there in its exposition to 
the distracted passers-by. Here it is not a sacred place that conserves and 
protects the power of that symbol. This fact, in particular, makes it clear 
how the medium not only embodies the depiction by the artist, but also 
plays a central role in doing this in a way that says something about the 
culture in which Abrham works. A culture in which art is made popular 
and accessible trough the popular use of its icons, including religious 
ones. These icons are not used to offer a figurative narration of the sto-
ries of the Christianity; rather, this narration is reconfigured to say some-
thing about the era in which such reconfiguration takes place. In The 
Open Work, Umberto Eco says something similar where he says that 
works of art give us pictures of reality that hold “as epistemological 
metaphors”. Eco rightly notes that works of art posses a double seman-
tics: in fact they are epistemic metaphors, which means that they say 
something about something trough representation and that they say 
something trough the structure of their body, the medium: “<...> art, as 
structuring of forms, has its own ways of talking about the world and 
man; it may happen that a work of art makes statements about the 
world through its topic – as in the subject of a novel or a poem – but 
first of all, as form, art makes statements about how it is structured, 
showing the historical and personal trends that have led to it and the 
implicit worldview manfested by a certain form” [Eco 1989, preface]. 
3. Normativity
Now that all the conditions that make up my definition have been 
explained, I would like to come back to the question of normativity. 
I mentioned that, ever since Duchamp introduced the ready-made in 
museums alongside traditional works of art, the ontological question 
has become urgent. Stated differently, the important caesura determined 
by contemporary art, specifically by the Dada movement and Abstract 
Expressionism, seems to really question the idea that the access to the 
understanding of art is given by sensibility. The whiteness of the urinal, 
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i.e. the properties of the color white, was certainly not the reason that 
prompted Duchamp to present a urinal built in series at an art competi-
tion. As the artist himself explained, he didn’t expect the audience to 
appreciate the aesthetic qualities of Fountain, quite the contrary. If any-
thing, the opposite was true: Duchamp was interested in the anesthetic 
dimension, since his goal was to create a work of art prescinding from 
the use of traditional aesthetic properties, first of all beauty.
The pursuit of “anaestheticness” is what distinguishes ready-mades 
from abstractism in which – think, for instance, of the works by Kazimir 
Malevič (fig. 4) – color is still a determinant element (which, in our
example, identifies the poetics of the Russian artist). In other words, 
Malevič’s abstract paintings are surely closer to figurative paintings 
than to Fountain and other ready-mades: in fact, for the latter it does 
not seem possible to appeal to any judgment of taste and, consequent-
ly, there seems to be no aesthetic normativity to which to refer. The 
hypothesis that I intend to verify at this stage is that the issue of nor-
mativity in contemporary art is subject to a revision of the definition 
of the very concept of art.
The key point in the case of the judgment of taste is the question of 
its universality, and therefore its normativity. For a long time, aesthetic 
normativity has had as its prerequisite the idea of beauty: as stated by 
Immanuel Kant, we expect that anyone who has seen or will see the 
Mona Lisa, can only find it beautiful and, therefore, can only express the 
exact same judgment. It therefore seems that there is a tension between 
the idea that judgments of taste, i.e. judgments that generally relate to 
matters subject to taste, are subjective (i.e. depend on the subjects that 
formulate them), and the idea that they aspire to achieve broad, even 
universal, consensus. In other words, they seem to be both subjective 
(individual) and objective (normative). So the judgment of taste claims 
to be normative, i.e. to establish itself as a rule that applies to everyone, 
not just the one who formulates it.
However, since artists freed themselves from beauty – as shown 
paradigmatically by Duchamp – the bond between art and the univer-
sality of the judgment of taste has become problematic. In the reshaping 
of the concept of art that I’m sketching here, the traces of meaning and 
the body of the artwork are fundamental, while the aesthetic properties 
of the medium are secondary. In other words, the artwork may or may 
not be beautiful – whatever that means – therefore it may or may not 
exhibit aesthetic properties, but the latter are not a necessary condition 
for its identity. It follows that there is no normativity of the judgment 
of taste that can be applied to contemporary art.
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Let me make another observation from the point of view of the his-
tory of the concept. One of the most successful readings of all events 
and self-transformations that art has imposed on itself in the Twentieth 
century is the one formulated by Arthur Danto, on the basis of what 
had already been somehow intuited by Hegel in The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, where he foresaw that art’s fate was to be resolved in philosophy. 
In The End of Art, Danto argues that the Avantgardes, which pushed art 
to revise the limits of its own definition, brought it to reach the extreme 
limit of its possibilities, or rather, of its own development. That’s why art 
won’t have a progressive development such as the one reconstructed by 
Vasari, but will rather be the expression of single individuals.
The same conclusion is also found in a work by Sara Fanelli exposed 
at Tate Gallery, London. The 40m-long work recreates the timeline of 
Twentieth century art history illustrating it through the names of its 
most important movements and artists. Significantly, from year 2000 
onwards Fanelli reports in her timeline only artist names. The history 
of art, as a history of progress, perhaps has come to an end, at least
according to what we can see from the historical perspective in which 
we find ourselves. What must be noted is that throughout the Twenti-
eth century art has lost its possibility to call for the universality of the 
judgment of taste as well its historical and progressive development. 
Danto suggests not to look at these losses with nostalgia: after all, the 
counterpart of all this is a great gain, that is, the almost absolute liberty 
that artists have won, breaking the canons, cultural traditions and final-
ly freeing themselves even from the demands of their patrons.
Our post-historical dimension allows us to draw a conclusion as to 
the issue of normativity. From our historical perspective, we know that 
the normativity of the judgment of taste is not about art, and on the 
other hand we have also reached a more meaningful understanding of 
the concept of art. We know that the visual arts, in their various forms, 
belong to the domain of sensible cognition and we know that the trace 
of meaning is of decisive importance to a work of art, more than its 
aesthetic properties. An artwork can be neither beautiful nor ugly, but 
it has to mean something. A great part of our relation with an artwork 
and our ability to interpret it consists precisely in developing a mean-
ingful interpretation of the semantic trace, which manifests itself in the 
work in the form of a non-argued narrative.
In contemporary art, therefore, it no longer makes sense to refer to the 
normativity of the aesthetic judgment, while my sense is that certainly 
normativity exists for what concerns the ways in which the semantic 
trace is incorporated in the artworks. An artwork really works – i.e. is 
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successful – in all those cases in which the significant trace is embodied 
in appropriate ways so that the viewers can have some kind of cognitive 
response, which can sometimes be also characterized in emotional terms.
Let me reach the conclusion with an example. Ursula Biemann is 
a Swiss artist who tries to render through her lens both the psycho-
logical and social dynamics of migration (Sahara Chronicle) and the 
transgenerational effects of phenomena like the exploitation of natu-
ral resources and climate change (Deep Weather). Biemann deals with 
video art and, more precisely, with what the artist defines “video 
essays”. To clarify this neologism we might refer to the idea that art, 
all art, embodies meanings. Biemann seems to be convinced of this
to the point of comparing her production (video) to a category that 
normally does not refer to art genres but rather to scientific works 
(essay). Deep Weather (2013, video 9’) is a video essay, which is differ-
ent from a video story. The aim is not simply to record facts – which 
typically happens with news reports – but to offer a worldview relat-
ed to the facts recorded. This means that the artist is fully aware of the 
artistic scope of her work as well of the aesthetic scope that makes the 
artistic one even more powerful.
Another interesting element concerns the use of the emotional 
element, which is generally very present in art and which we would 
expect to be present, even more significantly, in works such as those by 
Biemann, as they address issues with a high emotional impact. Yet, the 
artist decides to make her work unemotional: if the mass media tend to 
underline the emotional aspect of these issues through a violent use of 
images, Biemann presents the problem in eminently critical terms. While 
the emotion is reduced to zero, the two video essays are strongly 
characterized in aesthetic terms. They are certainly very beautiful, not 
only made using sophisticated techniques, but also endowed with 
a strong aesthetic element.
It is Duchamp’s artistic project that allows Fountain to become an 
artwork, and that project marks the difference between Fountain and 
any other Bedfordshire urinal. In the same way, Biemann’s project 
marks the difference between a skillful shooting of migrants landing 
made by a reporter and Biemann’s video. In all the cases we have 
examined the artistic project is fundamental and involves both the 
work on art’s own expressive potential – in other words, art’s reflection 
on its being a medium – and the representations through which the 
artist manifests his or her worldview.
Now, it is evident that the ontological variety of contemporary art 
implies a multiplicity of forms and ways in which the incorporation 
26
ΠΡΑΞΗΜΑ. 2015. 4 (6)
of the conceptual trace takes place: a filmic documentary work has 
different characteristics and therefore different ways and possibilities 
of incorporating meaning from those of other forms of visual art, for 
example sculpture or painting. Video art, like performing art, allows 
the artist to incorporate the traces of more complex and, in some way, 
more structured narratives. I introduced the idea of conceptual trace, 
which I prefer to that of concept, because even with the most explicit 
and structured narratives such as Biemann’s works, it is evident that 
a reality shown and told in artistic ways – involving an articulate project 
and a complex narrative – is different from the philosophical reflection 
on the same reality. The trace embodied in artworks is a signifying ele-
ment that the artists inscribes in the work and that viewers complete in 
their own ways, which can be more or less sophisticated and elaborate. 
The interpretative boundaries, the argumentative and logical structure 
of the meaning exposed, the use of the emotional element: all these 
things mark a difference between the significant trace embodied in art-
works and the conceptual structure found in philosophy.
Biemann’s video essays express their meaning in a very simple and 
direct way, while for people to understand something of the trace of 
meaning that Duchamp incorporated in Fountain it was necessary that 
the artist wrote down his poetics. Which makes Fountain a less success-
ful work than Deep Weather. It is likely that no human being would 
understand something about Fountain unless she has studied it, read 
about it or met Duchamp in person. On the other hand, none of this
is needed to understand that Sahara Cronicle addresses the status of 
human rights and the policies of their application.
There is double normativity in Biemann’s video essays: the first 
regards the structure of the medium, the second concerns the structure 
of the semantic trace embodied in the medium.
The work doesn’t speak to us at the emotional level, and the 
dyscrasy between the narrated horror and the unemotional way in 
which it is narrated is so evident that it has to be the outcome of 
a specific artistic choice. The combination of these two elements 
makes it so that the sematic trace of Biemann’s work is grasped 
through an evident communicational short circuit: the tragedy is 
detached from emotions but juxtaposed to the weakness of the 
normative and theoretical framework of Western culture. From this 
weakness derives a staggering ethical and political sloth.
After all, Biemann adds nothing to the chronicle of migration: she 
goes through it, follows it closely, renders it accessible to the audience 
in a short time. Nevertheless, there is only one way to respond to this 
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artwork, as it demands both a universal and an individual response: 
we must question the foundations and meaning of Western values and, 
ultimately, reconsider our idea of humanity.
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